| The “caidalism” is a form of organization of the rural society in Morocco
starting at the end of the XIX century and ending with independence in 1956 (P.
Pascon).
Is caidalism a by-product of colonialism? As some authors state. Not really,
because if the rise of the ‘grand caids’ in the region
of Marrakech was made possible by the colonial threat, and was facilitated later
on by France once it had established its rule over Morocco [1] “caidalism” was
not created by the colonial ruler from scratch
In fact, the makhzen had always imposed the Zakat
(tax imposed on Muslims by the Koran) on the tribes. It had also obliged them
to provide men (along with arms and horses and their subsistence) to subdue
rebellious tribes (those which refused to pay taxes and to supply contingents)
to overthrow a pretender or a disobedient marabout….
To do so, the makhzen would address the amghars (traditional leader chosen by
their tribe-fellows, as intermediates).
The foreign threat in the second half of the XIX century resulted in more pressure
applied on the tribes [2] (more taxes to buy arms and to reimburse the national
debt, more combatants to provide the makhzen with…)
to face this menace. The makhzen , thus, needed a
more efficient intermediate in order to increase taxes and to enroll more armed
men. It needed men of its own rather than intermediaries that are more loyal
to their tribes than to its cause. Thus the amghars became caids, they became
more makhzen agents than go-between (the makhzen and the tribesmen) with more
common interests with their fellows tribesmen than with the makhzen’s. From
now on, the ‘caidality’ took the tyrannical form that had been associated with
this institution until Independence.
In other words, the caids were (already as early as the XVII century and probably
even earlier) amghars elected by the tribes they belonged to. Their role was
that of intermediaries between the tribes and the makhzen that acknowledged
them as so by dahirs. They collected the taxes (on
behalf of the makhzen to whom they handed over a share), and they maintained
troops to carry out raids on their neighbors, when they were not engaged in
harkas for the makhzen to subdue disobedient tribes
After the middle of the XIX century, the position of caid as a makhzen representative
prevailed over that of amghar, which did not disappear, after the nomination
of caids at the head of tribes they did not belong [3] to. They were allowed
to keep a part of the taxes that they collected and the makhzen tolerated the
use of their new power to subdue other groups and to become richer.
Instead of reinforcing the makhzen and of saving it from the colonial threat,
this policy hastened its downfall in the following downward spiral: more pressure
on tribes => more uprising => more prosecution and even more systematic
destruction to reduce revolts (“an empty bag cannot stand alone” as
says a popular proverb) => impoverishment of the country and the makhzen
=> more debts…
One has, then, to admit that ‘caidality’ goes back as far as the
XVII century (or even earlier), and that it had been reinforced dramatically
in two occasions: the first under the reign of Moulay Abderrahmane due to the
colonial threat, and the second, which is more important, under the French rule.
[1] See ‘ the grand caids policy’.
[2] Beside the zakat, the tribes had to pay the following taxes:
Farida: a tax to reimburse foreign loans.
Mouna: a cash tax to feed the makhzen troops while in a campaign.
Hedeya: a present to the caid in the occasion of feasts (who hands over part
of it to the sultan)
· Kulfa or touiza: unpaid labor on the lands of the caid and the makhzen.
[3] P.Pascon stated that no one of the great caids (Glaoui, Mtouggi, Goundafi)
originates in the tribe that he represented.
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